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) NO. 44960
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) TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR42-15-11025
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After seventeen-year-old Alex James Chappell pled guilty to possession of marijuana
with the intent to deliver, the district court sentenced him to five years, with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. About four months later, the district court relinquished jurisdiction without
a hearing. Alex then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion. The district court held
a hearing and denied the motion. Alex now appeals to this Court, arguing the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and by denying his Rule 35 motion.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 30, 2015, a police officer was dispatched to Alex’s family home in reference to a
drug call. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 p.4.) Alex’s stepfather believed Alex had
marijuana in his room. (PSI, p.4.) Alex was seventeen years old and just finished his junior year
of high school. (PSI, pp.2, 4, 12.) The police officer searched his room and found 3.83 ounces of
marijuana. (PSI, pp.4–5.) The next day, the State filed a Petition in magistrate court alleging
Alex committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, with the intent to
deliver, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a), (e). (R., pp.10–11.) Alex stipulated to the waiver of
juvenile court jurisdiction. (R., p.63.) Based in part upon the stipulation, the magistrate issued a
decree waiving jurisdiction. (R., pp.63–65.)
Alex then waived a preliminary hearing. (R., pp.84–86.) The magistrate bound him over
to district court. (R., pp.84–86.) The State charged him with possession of marijuana with the
intent to deliver. (R., pp.88–89.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Alex pled guilty to the charge.
(R., pp.94, 98; Tr.  Vol. I,2 p.8, Ls.7–16, p.11, L.20–p.13, L.7.) The State agreed to recommend
three  years  of  probation,  with  an  underlying  sentence  of  four  years,  with  two  years  fixed.
(R., p.98.)
Alex failed to comply with court compliance and failed to appear at the first sentencing
hearing. (R., pp.98, 134–38, 147.) As such, the State was no longer bound by its
recommendation and recommended a sentence of five years, with two years fixed. (R., p.98;
Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.20–24, p.7, Ls.10–11.) In addition, the State recommended the district court
1 Citations  to  the  PSI  refer  to  the  eighty-two  page  electronic  document  containing  the
confidential exhibits, including the Addendum to the PSI (“APSI”).
2 There  are  two  transcripts  on  appeal.  The  first,  cited  as  Volume  I,  contains  the  entry  of  plea
hearing, held on December 21, 2015. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the sentencing
hearing, held on June 13, 2016, and the Rule 35 motion hearing, held on February 17, 2017.
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retain jurisdiction instead of probation.3 (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.19–20.) Alex requested probation or,
in the alternative, a period of retained jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, Ls.17–19.) The district court
sentenced him to five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.159–63;
Tr. Vol. II, p.15, Ls.7–12.)
About four months after sentencing, the district court issued an order relinquishing
jurisdiction. (R., pp.169–71.) The district court did not hold a hearing. (R., p.170.) The district
court’s decision was based solely on the APSI, which informed the district court that Alex
received two formal disciplinary sanctions (“DORs”) for tattooing in a correctional facility and
possession of drugs (inhaling NO2 gas). (PSI, p.75.) Alex timely appealed from the district
court’s order. (R., pp.173–74.)
Alex then moved for reconsideration of his sentence pursuant to Rule 35. (R., p.180.) The
district court held a hearing on the motion and took the matter under advisement. (See generally
Tr. Vol. II, p.18, L.6–p.80, L.9.) Four days later, the district court issued an order denying Alex’s
Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.220–23.)
3 The written plea agreement included an appeal waiver. It stated in relevant part:
By accepting this offer the defendant waives the right to: . . . appeal any issue in
this case, including . . . the sentence . . . . However, the defendant may appeal the
sentence if the Court exceeds the recommendation made by the State at
sentencing regarding: (1) the determinate portion of the sentence, and/or (2) a
probation recommendation, and/or (3) a retained jurisdiction recommendation.
(R., p.98.) During the entry of plea, the district court informed Alex that only “two exceptions”
to the appeal waiver “would apply here”: “If the Court exceeded the fixed part of the State’s
recommendation, that being the two years, or if I declined to put you on probation, then you have
the right of appeal. Short of that, you do not.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.7–15.) However, this appeal
waiver provision is no longer valid, as the plea agreement itself was not binding on the parties by
the time of sentencing. Alex breached the agreement by failing to appear at a hearing and by
failing to comply with court compliance; the State recommended a harsher sentence. Because the




I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of five
years, with two years fixed, without probation, upon Alex, following his guilty plea to
possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Alex’s Rule 35 motion?
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five Years,
With Two Years Fixed, Without Probation, Upon Alex, Following His Guilty Plea To Possession
Of Marijuana With The Intent To Deliver
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the  burden  of  showing  a  clear  abuse  of  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  court  imposing  the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Alex’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.
See I.C. § 37-2732(e) (five year maximum). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was
unreasonable, Alex “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive
under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002). Similarly,
“[t]he  choice  of  probation,  among available  sentencing  alternatives,  is  committed  to  the  sound
discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1990).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
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Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Here, Alex asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. He contends the district court should have
suspended execution of his sentence and placed him on probation in light of the mitigating
factors, including his young age, troubled childhood, and family support.
Alex grew up in an unstable environment. His parents “always fought” when he was a
child. (PSI, p.10.) His father was an alcoholic and used drugs. (PSI, p.39.) Alex remembers his
parents “throwing stuff and breaking things.” (PSI, p.37.) Likely in response to the trauma at
home, Alex started acting out in the fourth grade and “hanging around the wrong kids.” (PSI,
p.37.) In 2010, around the same time his parents separated, Alex started using marijuana and
haze (synthetic marijuana). (PSI, pp.13–14, 37, 38.) After his parents’ divorce, Alex lived
primarily with his father. (PSI, pp.10, 40.) His father “was his best friend,” and they were very
close. (PSI, p.10.) Then, in January of 2013, Alex’s father died unexpectedly of a heart attack in
his sleep. (PSI, pp.10, 37.) Alex, who was fourteen years old at the time, was the last person to
see his father alive. (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, L.6.) Alex “struggled greatly” to cope with his father’s
death. (PSI, p.10.) A close family friend explained:
Alex and his father were very close. Almost too close at times. They did
everything together such as dirt bike riding and camping. I believe Alex has not
fully dealt with the grief of his father’s sudden death three years ago. Since that
time, Alex has battled with depression and the feeling of worthlessness. I have
seen first hand [sic] how hard it has been for him to grow up without a father and
to lose such an important person in the midst of his teenage years. He has had so
much grief that it became a challenge for him to communicate with other people.
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(PSI, p.26.) Following his father’s death, Alex was diagnosed with depression, prescribed anti-
depressants, and considered suicide. (PSI, pp.13, 36, 37, 39.) He moved back in with his mother
and stepfather. (PSI, p.10.) He also received counseling through the Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare, Children’s Mental Health. (PSI, p.22.) Before his father’s death, Alex was very
active in sports, especially boxing, but this and other positive aspects of his life fell to the
wayside as he continued to make poor choices. (PSI, pp.11, 12, 22, 26, 40; Tr. Vol. II, p12, Ls.6–
23.) Alex kept using drugs and alcohol, hanging out with the wrong crowd, and getting in
trouble, culminating with the instant offense. (PSI, pp.6–9, 13–14, 39, 40.)
After  the  instant  offense,  Alex  realized  he  had  to  change.  He  told  the  district  court  at
sentencing:
I  know what  mistakes  I  made.  I  wish  I  could  take  them back.  Two months  I’ve
spent in this jail has been a learning experience. I never want to come back to this
place. This has been the longest I’ve been incarcerated. There are people in this
jail twice and three times my age still making the same mistakes. That’s not who I
want to be. That’s not who I want to be around. I’d rather get it into my head now
before I waste my life behind bars because each day I am locked up is a day I can
never get back. I’m better than this, I just want to prove it.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.10, L.20–p.11, L.4.) Alex also told the district court that he was motivated to
succeed, was ready to turn his life around, and had learned from his mistakes. (See Tr. Vol. II,
p.10, L.20–p.13, L.13.) Further, he explained to the district court that he had not fully dealt with
his father’s death and that he wanted to make his father proud. (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, Ls.5–11.) Once
Alex turned eighteen (about four months before sentencing), he started receiving survivor
benefits through social security. (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, Ls. 11–12.) He only received those benefits if
he enrolled in school, passed his classes, and was not incarcerated. (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, Ls.12–14.)
He told the district court that he planned to save that money while he finished high school and
then use it to enroll in the College of Southern Idaho for an associate’s degree in business and
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financing. (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, Ls.16–20.) In sum, Alex’s plan on probation was “to continue
intensive  outpatient,  obtain  another  job,  complete  summer  school,  and  right  after  my  final
semester of high school, I will get back into the boxing gym, start competing again.” (Tr. Vol. II,
p.12, L.24–p.13, L.2.)
Moreover, Alex had great support from his family. His mother, sister, and two close
family friends wrote letters of support. (PSI, pp.21–27.) In one letter, his mother stated:
Alex is a person with a good heart. Alex has not had the normal teenage
experience. Life has thrown him more of this terrible world than most of us will
ever go through. Through it all, the good and the bad, as well as the joys and
sorrows, he has remained a good soul. I strongly believe in Alex.
Alex is remorseful for his mistakes. I believe sentencing him to a term in
prison would only expose him to further bad influences. I humbly ask you to
please give Alex an opportunity to set his life back on track and not let a bad
decision alter his life's direction.
(PSI, p.21.) His sister explained:
I care about Alex’s future and I want to try to make you feel the same
way.
Alex is a person of good moral character. I realize that might seem hard to
believe, given his history, but it’s true nonetheless. I have seen him go through
ups and downs, but all the while I have been convinced that he is a kind and
decent person at the core. I believe that he just needs some guidance. He just
needs to know that people believe in him so that he can become the person I know
he is on the inside.
Alex has made some mistakes, but he is incredibly remorseful, and is
willing to do whatever it takes to make amends. I believe that he just needs a
chance  to  show everyone  that  he  is  a  good person.  I  realize  that  Alex  broke  the
law, and I do not believe that he should go without punishment.
I believe that Alex known [sic] realizes how large the repercussions are of
breaking the law. As a result of his time spent in custody, he lost his job. I believe
this  was  a  wake-up  call  for  him and  I  truly  believe  that  in  the  future  he  will  do
better.
(PSI, p.24.) Along with these letters of support, Alex’s mother was present at the sentencing
hearing. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, L.2.) Alex’s attorney informed the district court that his mother had
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been in contact with a local doctor to establish a treatment plan for Alex on probation. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.9, Ls.3–16.)
This information available at sentencing showed Alex could succeed on probation.
Despite his setbacks as a juvenile, Alex was motivated to become a contributing member of
society, and he had the family support to make those changes. But the district court did not give
adequate weight to this information. For example, the district court faulted Alex for thinking
only about himself (such as his plan for probation) rather than how his crime harmed the
community. (Tr. Vol. II, p.13, L.25–p.14, L.14.) It is unreasonable, however, to expect someone
of Alex’s age and background to have the wherewithal to fully grasp how his crime affected
others. The district court should have viewed Alex’s goal to succeed on probation as a mitigating
factor. Similarly, the district court faulted Alex for being smart and motivated to get sober.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.15–25.) The district court focused on Alex’s belief that he could easily get
sober if he “really put effort into it” as showing that he made the choice to sell marijuana.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.15–25.) Again, it is unreasonable to hone in on single statement made by a
teenage boy on his goals for sobriety and then base sentencing decisions on that statement.
As  another  example,  the  district  court  failed  to  give  any  weight  to  Alex’s  youth  as  a
mitigating circumstance. The district court stated at sentencing:
Trust me, I’m very sensitive to the fact that a person of your age has the potential
not  to  fare  well  in  the  Idaho  State  Penitentiary,  okay?  I  understand  that.  But
you’re in the big leagues now. We’re not in juvenile court anymore. Your life so
far in the judicial system has been a slap on the wrist.
(Tr.  Vol.  II,  p.15,  Ls.1–6.)  After  ordering  the  period  of  retained  jurisdiction,  the  district  court
went on to describe “what you are about to have happen to you in your life” while on the rider.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.15, L.20–p.16, L.10.) The district court discussed how Alex would fare in adult
prison:
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[On the rider,] [y]ou’re going to be in – associating with people just like
you have seen in the Twin Falls County jail. Some of those people are going to be
very motivated to change their lives. Some of those people are there to play the
game, okay? They won’t last very long because they’ll get shipped to Boise to go
out and serve their sentences. You have to be your own man. By that I mean make
your own decisions, and if you are truly committed to wanting to change your life,
you will get a ton out of this program, and if you’re just here to play the game, I’ll
get a report back that says Alex Chappell doesn’t really want to program, impose
his sentence. Then you and I won’t see each other anymore. Then you will be
living up at the main site. What do you suppose happens there to somebody your
size? Think you’re a boxer? You would be a punk in that system, given your size,
the way you look. Nothing wrong with the way you look, but you’re fair game.
Believe me, that is not a life you want to live.
I think that you have got to make some significant mental changes in your
life, and I think this program is the best I can offer you. I think if I put you back
on probation  today,  it  would  just  be  a  question  of  time before  you  relapsed  and
got back in trouble again. I’m not going to do it. It’s time that you faced the
consequences for the decision that you made.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.16, L.11–p.17, L.9 (emphasis added).) Examining these statements, Alex submits
the district court failed to give any consideration to his young age as a mitigating factor. Instead,
the district court openly acknowledged that Alex would be “a punk” and “fair game” in prison
“given your size” and “the way you look.” In addition, the district court failed to give sufficient,
if any, weight to the support of his family. In light of Alex’s age, maturity level, and troubled
childhood, the district court failed to exercise reason in fashioning the appropriate sentence for
Alex. Therefore, he submits the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Alex’s Rule 35 Motion
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). Rule
35 states in relevant part:
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The court may correct a sentence that has been imposed in an illegal
manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence. The court
may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the filing of a judgment of conviction
or within 120 days after the court releases retained jurisdiction. . . . Motions to
correct or modify sentences under this rule must be filed within 120 days of the
entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction
and shall be considered and determined by the court without the admission of
additional testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the
court  in  its  discretion;  provided,  however  that  no  defendant  may  file  more  than
one motion seeking a reduction of sentence under this Rule.
I.C.R. 35(b).4 In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the
entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original
sentence.” Carter, 157 Idaho at 903. The Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record,
having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the
public interest.” State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken
from  an  order  refusing  to  reduce  a  sentence  under  Rule  35,”  the  Court’s  scope  of  review
“includes all information submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent
hearing held on the motion to reduce.” State v. Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985).
“When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of
the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
4 This version of Rule 35 was in effect when Alex filed his motion. Effective July 1, 2017, Rule
35 reads:
Within 120 days of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order
releasing retained jurisdiction, a motion may be filed to correct or reduce a
sentence and the court may correct or reduce the sentence. . . . Motions are
considered and determined by the court without additional testimony and without
oral argument, unless otherwise ordered. A defendant may only file one motion
seeking a reduction of sentence.
I.C.R. 35(b).
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Recently, this Court outlined the appropriate requests for relief in a Rule 35 motion after
relinquishment. In State v. Flores, the defendant filed a Rule 35 motion after relinquishment
requesting that the district court reinstate jurisdiction. No. 43946, 2017 Opinion No. 68, pp.1, 5
(June 20, 2017). This Court held that Rule 35 does not allow the district court to consider that
request. Id. at p.5 & n.1. This Court reasoned:
Rule 35 does not create a general basis for requesting reconsideration of an order
or a judgment in the criminal context. Rule 35 instead narrowly operates to permit
the correction, modification, or reduction of criminal sentences in certain
instances. Flores’s request for jurisdiction to be reinstated does not constitute a
correction, modification, or reduction of a criminal sentence. Thus, Rule 35 is
inapplicable here.
Id. at  p.5.  This  Court  also  noted,  “In  fact,  there  is  no  criminal  procedural  rule  that  provides  a
basis to reconsider a decision of this kind.” Id. at  p.5  n.1.  Thus,  none  of  the  criminal  rules,
including Rule 35, permit a defendant to request that the district court reinstate jurisdiction after
relinquishment. Here, in contrast, Alex requested the district court place him on probation.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.71, L.25–p.72, L.1.) This constitutes a modification of his sentence—the sentence
is suspended, rather than imposed. As such, Alex’s motion was within the confines of Rule 35
and Flores.
Turning to the merits, Alex submits the district court abused its discretion by denying his
Rule 35 motion. Initially, the district court had relinquished jurisdiction, without a hearing, after
learning Alex received two DORs for tattooing in a correctional facility and allegedly possessing
drugs (inhaling NO2 gas). (PSI, p.75; R., pp.169–71.) At the Rule 35 motion hearing, the
evidence showed that the DOR for drug possession had been dismissed. (R., pp.183, 186, 220–
21; Tr. Vol. II, p.26, L.19–p.27, L.8, p.63, Ls.12–16; see also Def.’s Ex. 1 (audio of disciplinary
hearings for both DORs).) Moreover, the district court stated at the hearing that it only
relinquished jurisdiction “because of the drug offense.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.78, Ls.6–8; see also
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R., p.221.) The district court also learned, however, that Alex got another tattoo and,
consequently, another DOR sometime after he filed the Rule 35 motion. (R., p.221; Tr. Vol. II,
p.29, Ls.9–24, p.30, L.18–p.31, L.2; State’s Ex. A.) Based on this information, the district court
reasoned:
The new DOR shows the Court that the defendant is willing to violate the
simplest of rules, even during the pendency of his Rule 35 motion when his
behavior would perhaps be scrutinized the most. The defendant knew the likely
consequences of this behavior from his first tattoo-related DOR months ago, yet
still willingly engaged in that same behavior. The defendant downplays his
decision as merely unwise or impulsive, but in the Court’s view it is evidence of
deep-seated criminal thinking. Despite whatever progress he has made while in
custody,  the  defendant  has  still  not  learned  respect  for  rules  and  is  therefore
ill-prepared for probation. Although it is now clear that the Court’s
relinquishment decision was largely misguided by the incomplete information in
the APSI regarding the drug-related DOR, the new DOR convinces the Court that
its decision was the appropriate one. For whatever reason(s), this defendant still
has not progressed to the point where he can be successful on probation.
(R., pp.222–23.) Alex contends the new tattoo DOR does not prove that he will be unsuccessful
on probation. As argued by his attorney, the new tattoo only illustrates that Alex is an impulsive
and immature teenager. (Tr. Vol. II, p.71, Ls.13–18.) It is not “evidence of deep-seated criminal
thinking.” (R., p.222.) Alex’s family support, mental health treatment plan, and commitment to
sobriety shows that he should be given the opportunity to be rehabilitated in the community
under proper control and supervision.
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CONCLUSION
Alex respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or,
in the alternative, vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new sentencing
hearing. Alternatively, Alex respectfully requests that this Court reverse or vacate the district
court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 25th day of July, 2017.
_________/s/________________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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